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I describe the entry process in a spatial market over an in…nite time
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is unbounded, the results derived from the single-period Stackelberg
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leader locates at the initial date.
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1 Introduction
The issue of entry and entry deterrence has received wide attention in the
literature on spatial competition, the research carried out in this …eld being
focussed upon three main topics, namely, (i) the analysis of sequential entry
by single-product …rms (Hay, 1976; Prescott and Visscher, 1977; Lane, 1980;
Eaton and Wooders, 1985; Neven, 1987); (ii) the existence of pure pro…ts in
the long-run (Eaton, 1976; Eaton and Lipsey, 1978); and (iii) the strategic
use of capital and/or brand proliferation as a barrier to entry (Schmalensee,
1978; Eaton and Lipsey, 1980; Judd, 1985; Bonanno, 1987). Most of the
existing literature on sequential entry makes use of a single-period setting
where the sequential nature of the game is captured by the assumption that
earlier movers act as Stackelberg leader, while later movers act as Stackelberg
followers. Hence, the relevance of time in determining …rms’ decisions is
summarised by the fact that, if a …rm moves (i.e., enters) …rst and another
moves (i.e., enters) second, the former can use strategically the information
contained in the best reply function of the latter.
A well known result derived by this approach in the linear model of spa-
tial di¤erentiation with single-product …rms is that a monopolist locates in
the middle of the product space. This position is also optimal when a sec-
ond …rm enters, as long as the resulting degree of product di¤erentiation is
su¢cient to ensure that no relocation incentive appears for the incumbent.1
Otherwise, the leader should anticipate this event and either (i) choose a
di¤erent location from the outset, if relocation costs are prohibitively high;
or (ii) relocate as soon as the rival enters, if this can be done costlessly.
The aim of this note is to highlight the in‡uence of time in determining
the …rst entrant’s decision as to location in the product space, under the
assumption that any relocation after the rival’s entry is impossible. I show
that, if …rms can choose any amount of reciprocal product di¤erentiation,
time is irrelevant and the single-period Stackelberg model o¤ers a good de-
scription of the entry process. If, instead, the amount of di¤erentiation that
can be supplied at equilibrium is bounded, and coincides with the space of
1For the model with quadratic transportation costs, see Bonanno (1987); Neven (1987);
Tabuchi and Thisse (1995); and Lambertini (1997). The same analysis is carried out by
Anderson (1987) under the assumption of linear transportation costs.
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consumer preferences, then the …rst entrant’s equilibrium location is closer
to the optimal monopoly location, the later is the date at which a second
…rm is expected to enter the market; conversely, the leader’s location is closer
to the simultaneous one-shot equilibrium location, the earlier the rival is ex-
pected to enter. This, in turn, entails that the degree of di¤erentiation at
equilibrium is negatively related with the amount of time along which the
…rst entrant expects to remain a monopolist.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The basic model and
the price stage are described in section 2. The entry process is laid out in
section 3. Finally, concluding remarks are in section 4.
2 Setup and price behaviour
The basic model shares many features with that introduced by d’Aspremont,
Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979). I consider a market for horizontally di¤eren-
tiated products where consumers are uniformly distributed with unit density
along the unit interval [0; 1]. Let this market exist over t 2 [0;1): Two
pro…t-maximising …rms, labelled as 1 and 2, sequentially choose locations
x1 and x2 and compete in prices simultaneously as soon as both are in the
market. I will consider both the case where …rms are to locate within the
unit interval, and the case where they are free to locate also outside [0; 1].
Accordingly, in the remainder of the paper, on the basis of the symmetry
of the model, I assume alternatively that x1 2 [0; 1=2] and x2 2 [1=2; 1]; or
x1 2 [¡1; 1=2] and x2 2 [1=2;1]:2 Firm 1 enters at t = 0, while …rm 2
enters at ¿ 2 [0;1): I assume that ¿ is certain and known from the outset to
both players. Entry entails a sunk cost F , such that location must be chosen
once and for all at the time of entry in order to maximise the discounted
‡ow of pro…ts from that instant onwards. This …xed cost may be thought of
as an irreversible R&D investment undertaken at t = 0. Such R&D activity
results in a new product immediately for …rm 1 and at time ¿ for …rm 2.
Unit production cost is assumed to be constant and equal across varieties.
Without further loss of generality, I normalise it to zero. Throughout the
time horizon considered, both …rms have the same discount rate ½:
The generic consumer located at a 2 [x1; x2] buys one unit of the good,
enjoying the following net surplus:
2This assumption is meant to exclude the possibility of leapfrogging by either …rm.
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U = s¡ pi ¡ c(xi ¡ a)2 ¸ 0; i = 1; 2; (1)
where xi and pi are …rm’s i location and mill price, respectively, and c > 0 is
the transportation cost rate. In the remainder of the paper, I suppose that
the reservation price s is never binding, so that full market coverage always
obtains. To ensure this, it must be assumed that s ¸ 3c (cf. Bonanno, 1987;
Harter, 1993). Let the demand function for …rm i be yki 2 [0; 1] in each
period t; with yki = 1 ¡ ykj : Then, …rm i’s instantaneous pro…t function is
¼ki = p
k
i y
k
i ; where superscript k = m; d indicates the relevant market regime
(monopoly or duopoly).
As long as the …rst …rm to enter the market (…rm 1) remains a monopolist,
her per period demand function is ym1 = 1: Hence, her pro…t function is
¼m1 = p
m
1 ; and she …nds it optimal to set a price such that the farthest
consumer’s net surplus at equilibrium is nil. Given the above assumption
about the strategy space in locations, such consumer is at the right extreme
of the segment, and the monopoly price and pro…ts are
pm1 = s¡ c(1¡ x1)2 = ¼m1 (x1) : (2)
Consider now the duopoly setting. One can easily derive from (1) the
location of the consumer who is indi¤erent between the two goods at generic
price and location pairs,
s¡ pd1 ¡ c(a¡ x1)2 = s¡ pd2 ¡ c(x2 ¡ a)2; (3)
as well as the demand functions, provided a 2 [x1; x2] :3
yd1 =
pd2 ¡ pd1 + c(x22 ¡ x21)
2c(x2 ¡ x1) ; y
d
2 = 1¡ y1: (4)
Suppose …rms set prices simultaneously. The Nash equilibrium in prices, for
a given pair of locations, is given by
pd1 =
c(x22 + 2x2 ¡ 2x1 ¡ x21)
3
; pd2 =
c(x21 ¡ 4x1 + 4x2 ¡ x22)
3
: (5)
As a result, per period individual pro…t functions simplify as follows:
¼d1(x1; x2) =
c(x2 ¡ x1)(x1 + x2 + 2)2
18
; ¼d2(x2; x1) =
c(x2 ¡ x1)(x1 + x2 ¡ 4)2
18
:
(6)
3If this condition is not met, e.g., if the indi¤erence condition is written under the
assumption that a 2 (x2; 1]; then it can be immediately veri…ed that the location of the
indi¤erent consumer is unde…ned.
4
3 The entry game
I assume that the game takes place in continuous time. Firm 2 enters at date
¿ , in a location x2 ¸ x1; which, in turn, must be chosen once and for all by
…rm 1 at date 0: In describing …rm’s choice of location, the …xed R&D cost
F can be disregarded. The objective function of …rm 1 is
¦1 =
Z ¿
0
[¼m1 (x1) ¢ e¡½t]dt+
Z 1
¿
[¼d1(x1; x2) ¢ e¡½t]dt ; (7)
while the objective function of …rm 2 is
¦2 =
Z 1
¿
[¼d2(x2; x1) ¢ e¡½t]dt : (8)
Obviously, it would be in …rm 2’s interest to enter as early as possible (con-
versely, …rm 1 would like to remain a monopolist as long as possible). How-
ever, an entry date ¿ > 0 can result either from unsuccessful R&D activity
by …rm 2 between 0 and ¿ ; or from a broad patent protection sheltering the
monopoly power of …rm 1 over the same time span. I intentionally leave the
explicit modelization of these elements out of the picture, in order to focus
upon the descriptive power of single-period Stackelberg games versus multi-
period entry games. It is reasonable to assume that, in maximising (7), …rm
1 acts as a Stackelberg leader by taking into account the best reply of …rm
2, implicitly de…ned by the …rst order condition for the maximisation of (8)
w.r.t. x2: Hence, the leader’s problem consists in maximising (7) under the
following constraint:
3x22 ¡ x21 ¡ 16x2 + 2x1x2 + 16 = 0; (9)
i.e., either x2 = 4 ¡ x1 or x2 = (x1 + 4)=3: As is well known (Anderson,
1988; Lambertini, 1997), products behave as strategic complements, and this
su¢ces to establish that the correct best reply of …rm 2 is x2 = (x1 + 4)=3:
Consider …rst the unconstrained case. I am going to prove the following:
Theorem 1 Assume (i) x1 2 [¡1; 1=2] and x2 2 [1=2;1] and (ii) …rm 1
acts as a Stackelberg leader in locations. Then, in equilibrium, x1 = 1=2 and
x2 = 3=2 for all ¿ 2 [0;1):
Proof. Observe that, in the unconstrained location game considered here,
…rms’ behaviour is dictated by …rst order conditions which replicate those of
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the well known single-period problem, in that, when …rm 2 enters at time ¿;
we know that x2 = (x1 + 4)=3 and
sign
@¦1
@x1
= sign
@¼1
@x1
: (10)
As a result, …rm 1 locates in x1 = 1=2 at date 0, which is optimal indepen-
dently of ¿: Firm 1’s equilibrium per period pro…ts are ¼m1 = s¡ c=4 for all
t 2 [0; ¿ ) and ¼d1 = 8c=9 for all t 2 [¿ ;1): Firm 2’s equilibrium per period
pro…ts are ¼d2 = 2c=9 for all t 2 [¿;1): Hence, this model replicates the static
one (see Tabuchi and Thisse, 1995; Lambertini, 1997).
Consider now the constrained case. The following holds:
Theorem 2 Assume (i) x1 2 [0; 1=2] and x2 2 [1=2; 1] and (ii) …rm 1 acts
as a Stackelberg leader in locations. Then, in equilibrium,
x1 =
13¡ 18e½¿ + 2p13¡ 90e½¿ + 812½¿
3
for all ¿ 2
Ã
ln(13=12)
½
;
ln(107=72)
½
!
;
x1 = 0 for all ¿ 2
"
0 ;
ln(13=12)
½
#
;
x1 =
1
2
for all ¿ 2
"
ln(107=72)
½
; 1
!
;
x2 = 1 for all ¿ 2 [0;1) :
Proof. Given the boundaries to the strategy space, x2 = 1: The …rst order
condition for …rm 1 at the location stage is then
@¦1
@x1
=
c(36e½¿ + 2(13¡ 18e½¿)x1 ¡ 3x21 ¡ 39)
18½e½¿
= 0 ; (11)
whose roots are
x1A =
13¡ 18e½¿ ¡ 2p13¡ 90e½¿ + 81e2½¿
3
; (12)
x1B =
13¡ 18e½¿ + 2p13¡ 90e½¿ + 81e2½¿
3
: (13)
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The above roots are real if
13¡ 90e½¿ + 81e2½¿ ¸ 0 ; (14)
i.e., if ½¿ ¸ ln[(5 + 2p3)=9], which is always true in that (5 + 2p3)=9 < 1.
It is immediate to check that the leader’s location is given by x1B; in that
@2¦1=@x
2
1 < 0 in x1B only, and
lim
¿!0 x1B = ¡
1
3
(15)
which coincides with the leader’s best reply to x2 = 1 in the single-period
unconstrained model. For any given ½; x1B is increasing and concave in ¿;
with x1B = 0 when ¿ = ln(13=12)=½, and x1B = 1=2 when ¿ = ln(107=72)=½:
This entails that x1 = 0 for all ¿ 2 [0 ; ln(13=12)=½] ; x1 = x1B for
all ¿ 2 [ln(13=12)=½ ; ln(107=72)=½] ; and, …nally, x1 = 1=2 for all ¿ 2
[ln(107=72)=½ ; 1) :
Theorem 1 states that, as long as the strategy space at the location stage
is unbounded, no loss of information on …rms’ behaviour is attached to the
single-period Stackelberg metaphor usually adopted to describe the entry
process. On the contrary, Theorem 2 shows that, if the strategy space is
bounded, then time matters in determining the leader’s location as a function
of the date at which the follower enters the market. If such entry takes place
early enough, the leader chooses not to exploit fully her own monopoly power
over the period [0; ¿ ); and locates at 0 from the outset; otherwise, if entry is
late enough, the opposite happens. In general, the later the follower enters
the market, the closer to 1=2 the leader locates at date 0: The straightforward
implication of this result is that the single-period Stackelberg modelization
of the sequential location choice o¤ers a good description of the entry process
if and only if the time span over which the …rst entrant remains a monopolist
is long enough.
As Theorem 2 highlights, the extent of product di¤erentiation x2 ¡ x1
that we expect to observe at equilibrium is smaller, the later the follower
enters the market. Then, a relevant corollary of Theorem 2 is the following:
Corollary 1 If the strategy space at the location stage is bounded, then prod-
uct di¤erentiation at equilibrium is non-increasing in ¿ :
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Finally, the situation where the incumbent may relocate costlessly can be
considered. If products can be redesigned freely at any point in time, which
could be the case if no sunk investment were required, then the incumbent
would (i) locate at 1=2 for all t 2 [0; ¿ ); and relocate to x1 = 0 from ¿
onwards, if the location space is [0; 1]; (ii) locate at 1=2 forever, if …rms can
choose any point along the real axis, also outside the boundaries of the linear
city. Hence, without sunk costs, the single-period approach usually adopted
in most of the existing literature involves no signi…cant loss of information
on the optimal behaviour of …rms.
4 Concluding remarks
The foregoing analysis has stressed the importance of real time in explaining
…rms’ behaviour as to product characteristics and the resulting degree of
di¤erentiation. In particular, the main …ndings are that (i) if the strategy
space is unbounded, the in…nite horizon model and the single period model
yield qualitatively similar results; (ii) if, instead, …rms are compelled to locate
within the consumer preference space, then the …rst entrant’s location is
closer to the middle of the market, the later is the date of entry of the rival
…rm, and conversely. Hence, if the …rst innovator expects to stand alone
on the market place for a long time, the equilibrium con…guration of the
location stage closely recalls the familiar Stackelberg equilibrium of a single-
period model. Otherwise, when the entry date of the follower is early enough,
equilibrium locations are the same as under simultaneous entry.
These results have some relevant consequences on our ability to describe
such aspects of …rms’ behaviour, as their R&D activities to discover and in-
troduce new products. This issue is tackled by Harter (1993) in the quadratic
transportation cost version of the linear model. He assumes that there are
no externalities to the R&D, so that the …rms’ discovery dates are indepen-
dent. Each …rm bears a …xed cost, which is sunk at the beginning of the
research activity, plus a constant cost in each period, during the time inter-
val over which she continues to undertake her R&D e¤ort. In his analysis,
Harter considers only location-speci…c R&D activities, and focuses upon the
case where the …rst innovator locates in the middle point of the market, and
the second innovator must evaluate whether to discontinue her R&D or not,
and, if not, she locates at one of the extremes. In the light of the above
results, this kind of investigation can be recast into a picture where R&D
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is not location-speci…c and each …rm chooses location according to both the
likelihood of entering …rst and the expected date at which the other …rm
would innovate.
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